Acknowledging reality

Operation Zarb-e-Azab has sparked a cyclical debate amongst Pakistanis. There are two sides to the argument and are broadly outlined below.

The critics argue that the army has no right to wage an operation that results in the loss of civilian lives in the area. The army seems to have embarked upon this course of action shortsightedly in the wake of the attack on the Karachi airport. The army- whose power seems to exceed that of the state- is a stakeholder in the state instead of being a protector of the state. Reports emanating from Internally Displaced Persons camps indicate a lack of planning and foresight to accommodate the migration out of the areas under attack. The army is also accused of simplifying the problem it faces- the Taliban are neither a monolithic group nor is the terrorism confined to the areas being targeted by the army. Violence cannot possibly end violence. The construction of a state/army versus Taliban/extremists binary is flawed because the former, have and continue to, use the latter for strategic interests.

Supporters of this operation argue that had the state not been weak enough, neither the Taliban nor the army would have been as powerful as they are today. The argument emphasizes the patriotic nature of the Pakistani troops on the group and their willingness to lay down their lives. The politicians are blamed for being weak willed and indecisive thus leaving the army no choice but to intercede. How could the army have possibly sat on the side and watched the country’s biggest airport come under attack? The Taliban must be taught a lesson. The supporters portray the army as the only concerned stakeholder in the country and as its only buffer between a slide into extremism and future glory. The army is heralded as the saviour of the villagers who have been forced to surrender to the Taliban. Clearly, the army is the only liberator that these villagers have.

Both sides of the argument are based on an implicit insistence of a right behaviour and a wrong behaviour. To the critics, the operation is the wrong course of action. To the supporters, the operation is the right course of action.  The critics detest violence for violence sake. The supporters cannot possibly let violence by the militants go unanswered. Between themselves, ideologues on both sides continue to twist themselves into a knot over the perceived inability of their opposite numbers to see the flaws in their respective arguments. It is a classic case of everybody is right and everybody is wrong.

Lost between this debate of right and wrong is the reality. The reality is that a (superficially) extremist ideology has managed to establish an alternate reality in the affected areas. I call it superficial because that is the side of this ideology exposed to the media and to the world. This extremism did not by itself walk into towns and villages and take them over. They managed to provide services to the residents of these towns and villages that the state (and the army) had failed to- a renegade judicial system; food; water; security. I am not saying that this ideology is not extremist- but that it is more than just extremism.

For better or for worse, this reality has taken a hold in certain areas of Pakistan. The driving ideology behind it is being manifested in different forms and under different names. On the one hand, there is no difference between TTP and LeJ for both are equally bold in their open contempt for anything but the literal interpretation of Islamic laws. On the other hand, there is a world of difference between them for TTP operates as a complete system of governance in the areas that it rules and LeJ is primarily a militant group focused on militant and sectarian activities. Both of these groups have a loyal following.

Both the critics and supporters of the operation will agree that the militant activities of the above groups are wrong. What they disagree on is how to tackle them. The critics of the operation believe a change can be instilled and that these violent activities can be controlled without the army resorting to violence. The supporters believe that the army must resort to violence to eliminate these groups altogether. Given that both critics and supporters agree on the objective– to get rid of the militant ideology- but disagree on the method means that both believe that they have the power to change the behaviour of these militant groups. Clearly, if they did not want a change and were happy with the status quo- they would disagree on the objective as well.

Anyways, what I mean to say is this- the belief of both the critics and the supporters that they have the power to bring a change is foolish. I do not believe that any stakeholder in the country- neither the army, nor the state and its institutions, nor its concerned citizens- have any power to bring about any change in this current existing state of this ideology. The ideology sprang from more than just sectarian rhetoric and gained a foothold not through mere preaching of orthodoxy but through the provision of services that the state failed to provide. Indeed, the activities of this ideology also involved mass killings of minority sect members, suicide bombings in urban cities, and a violent aversion to many other things that we consider to be the bare minimum for a society. Yet, that is an aspect of this ideology and not its whole.

At this point in time, this ideology being right or wrong does not matter- what matters is that it is real. It does not matter what name it has, or what group it is, or what geographical association we label it with- all that matters is that it is exists and that it exists more prominently than it did a decade ago. Therefore, any attempts to simply come in and tackle this ideology are fundamentally misguided. The social narrative is bent on insisting that this a problem that could be fixed. I firmly believe that we are past that stage. This ideology is a reality and the sooner Pakistan learns to accept and acknowledge it as such, the better for it and its people.

The Myth of the Muslim Ummah

Last week, I came across an article titled ‘The myth of a Sunni-Shia war’. The author explained the historical conflict between the groups, referred to today as Sunnis and the Shias, as follows-

“The most common myth associated with the Sunni-Shia thesis is that Islam has been rent asunder by the sectarian conflict since its inception. This is simply reading history through solely modern eyes.

There was of course a dispute about religious authority following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Historical specificities aside, the Sunni and Shia divide was largely a political one. There were no direct theological implications until the 10th and 11th centuries when orthodoxies began to settle and a Sunni Islam became distinct from a Shia Islam, led in separate directions as they developed distinct legal and interpretative traditions.

The lines have always been blurred between Sunnis and Shias, and they are so blurred that it is often difficult to make a distinction at all in the early centuries of Islam – for example, both Sunnis and Shias celebrate and claim for their own many of the same historical figures. Many of the Imams of Twelver Shiism are regarded as pious and orthodox by Sunni Muslims. Identities were fluid too, so that the revolution that put the Abbasid’s in power in the 9th century started as strongly Shia but ended as ardently Sunni.

…

The argument that Sunnis and Shias have been at each others throats since the 7th century is wrong in every way possible.“

This is a shame because the authors overall conclusion- that a sectarian binary to examine the Middle East with is flawed- is something I wholeheartedly agree with. Unfortunately, his reading of history is as flawed as the sectarian binary he seeks to dismiss. That the author is a doctoral candidate in Islamic History is regrettable.

The truth of the matter in Islam is this- there has never been a united version of Islam save for the time that Mohammed was alive. This is because Mohammed, the divinely appointed last of the prophets, was the law. Any digressions from Mohammed or his teachings meant opposing the living personification of Islam and therefore being excluded from the Islamic fold. All histories- regardless of sectarian affiliations- behold his time period in Islamic history as one of perfection.

Yet, less than twenty-four hours after his death, the Muslims were already busy fighting amongst themselves for political and religious succession. The writers claim that this conflict was “largely a political one” is wrong. As students of religion would understand, Mohammed was what Weber calls a charismatic authority. He attracted people to the religion he claimed was divine and united warring factions. He made impressive social changes like giving women rights in a land where female infanticide was rampant. He would go on to rule Medina where he was elected by popular consent. From there he oversaw subsequent conquests of Mecca and other parts of Arabia. He died when the Muslim army was at its strongest and therefore the vacant position of the head of the Muslim peoples enticed many aspiring claimants.

As explained by Weber, the death of a charismatic authority opens up space for a routinization of authority into new offices. The hole left behind by the charismatic figure is too big, and too daunting, to be filled by one person alone and therefore it is institutionalized into an office. As history would play out, two major offices with equal, initial claims to Mohammed’s religious authority emerged- one was the Caliphate and the other was the Imamate. When the conflict erupted following Mohammed’s death, it was not just for political leadership as the author argues but also for religious leadership for in Islam, there is no official separation of the church and the state.

The authors claim that there were “…no direct theological implications until the 10th and 11th centuries when orthodoxies began to settle and a Sunni Islam became distinct from a Shia Islam” is also completely false. Najam Haider’s groundbreaking, methodological research in The Origins of the Shia documents how in the 8^th century there existed at least six different, well defined schools of thought in Kufa, Iraq alone. The author of this article claims a farther date and lesser divisions within Islam and seeks to imply that the gradual splitting of Islam into two different sects was a consequence of time and history. He conveniently overlooks the established presence of four major jurisprudential, and often at odds, schools of thought within the Sunni population alone as well as Zaidis and proto-Shias in Najam’s Kufa.

A good example to demonstrate that such theological differences were indeed influential in day to day life is the cases over the legality of alcohol as well as the directions of political allegiance. The Sunni schools of thought continued to argue about the legality of alcohol well into the 8^th century while the Shia schools of thought advocated hiding one’s faith to avoid persecution at the hands of the Sunni rulers. In the first case of alcohol, the religious ruling applied to one’s day to day private and public life. In the second case, the religious ruling dictated an individuals political behaviour by disguising one’s faith and professing to be Sunni. Legal and interpretive traditions had already taken a strong foothold within Islam by 8^th century and for the author to dismiss this is to promote erroneous history.

The line was not often blurred, unlike the author’s assertion, and that it was evident which schools of thought a Muslim subscribed to. The pious men of the Shias, the Imams, are considered revered in Sunni Islam because they carry the bloodline of Mohammed but the pious men of the Sunnis, the Caliphs, are held in contempt in Shia Islam because of their roles in the deaths of Fatima, Mohammed’s daughter, and the subsequent nepotism during Usman’s reign. Indeed, even transmitters of the sayings of the Prophet differ markedly. It is hard to find a common chain of transmitters between the Sunnis and the Shias. This implies that even Mohammed’s teachings were only conveyed intra-sects and not inter-sects.

The Abbasid empire also did not start as pro-Shias. The Abbasids advertised the cause of Mohammed’s progeny as a pretext to their ruling ambitions. A cursory reading of history on either sides of the sectarian libraries reveals this fact.

Another contentious claim is that the Shias and the Sunnis did not fight in the 7^th century. This, too, is false. The conflict after Mohammed’s death was rooted in the fact that Ali, his closest male relative as well as trusted commander, was performing Mohammed’s funeral rights when the Quraysh gathered at Saqifa and asked to nominate a person from their tribe, the same tribe that Mohammed belonged to, as a leader. The Ansar, the residents of Medina, disputed this claim. They argued that this being their city, and them being Mohammed’s hosts, they had the right to nominate one of their own. The Quraysh, more powerful and well equipped, took out their swords and forced the Ansar into accepting one of Quraysh’s representatives as the leader. So even before Ali’s claim, grounded in lineage and spiritual succession, is ever introduced, there is already a socio-political division within the Muslims. Abu Bakr was thus elected through compulsion and the threat of violence and not democracy as is often touted.

Ali’s claim was voiced more by his friends than by him and his eventual rule was marked by political naivety and civil wars. The three battles he fought were all against fellow Muslims and would markedly distinguish his followers, the Shias, from those of Aisha and Muawiya who both claimed to seek revenge for Usman as well as from those who deserted Ali’s army because they found him too forgiving of Muawiya and Aisha! Those were the first battles and certainly not the last so for the author to claim that the Shias and the Sunnis never fought in 7th century Arabia is highly problematic and ignorant. The groups above split into more and more splinter groups over times and thus challenge conceptions of Islam as a monolithic, unifying religion.

The author fails to understand Islam means two different things to two groups of people. To the Sunnis, Islam is the all-embracing religion of peace and virtue and therefore, to the majority of Sunnis, the Shias are just fellow Muslims, albeit with questionable practices. To the Shias, Islam is predicated on a grave injustice (the usurping of Ali’s right to rule and Hussain’s subsequent death) and thus they construct their worldview as one of resistance to any Sunni oppression. Within these cosmologies also exists significant differences- Sunnis view Mohammed as a mortal and as the last of the Prophets. In Sunni cosmology, there is no room for intercession from other powers. Shia beliefs are predicated on the necessity of intercession from their Imams. Shias also believe the world to have been created after the creation of Mohammed and Ali- a core belief which is not shared by Sunnis. Such differences are numerous and telling. These cosmologies therefore inform these groups with different histories.

This is why even though there might be temporary political alliances inspired out of common positive externalities, any potential returns to an identity that existed only under Mohammed will always be an elusive target. There is no such thnig, and there hasn’t been since Mohammed’s death, a Muslim Ummah.